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In defence of influence?
Paul Noordhof
David Lewis now holds that
(L1) C causes E iff C stands in the ancestral of influence to E.
(L2) C influences E iff (i) C and E are actual distinct events and (ii)
there is a substantial range of C1, C2, … of different not-too-
distant alterations of C and a range E1, E2, of alterations of E,
at least some of which differ, such that if C1 had occurred, E1
would have occurred, if C2 had occurred, E2 would have
occurred and so on (Lewis 2000).
Jonathan Schaffer has argued that David Lewis’s new account of causation
identifies neither necessary or sufficient conditions for causation (Schaffer
2001). Unfortunately, although his discussion is stimulating and ingenious,
it is defective in important places. In this brief note, I shall explain why. I
then develop one of his cases in a way which seems to work better and use
it to pose a challenge for Lewis. My discussion suggests that the very moti-
vation which Lewis used for his theory, trumping cases, is responsible for
where it goes wrong.1
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1 I believe that the theory I defended in Mind 1999 can deal with trumping (the role of
clause (IV) is of crucial importance) without giving rise to the problems identified in
this brief paper. Nevertheless, I shall not seek to establish that here.
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Here is Schaffer’s rather dramatic counter-example. Pam is locked in a
room with a simple on-off button which is activated just before she presses
the button. Before that, the button was dead. Bob is locked in a room which
contains a vast switchboard which enables him to modify Pam’s signal or
electrocute Vic himself and closed circuit TV revealing Vic covered with
electrodes and strapped to a chair. Pam presses the button and Vic is elec-
trocuted at t. Bob just watches what happens on TV. Intuitively, Pam is the
cause of his electrocution and Bob’s watching is not.
One of Schaffer’s charges is that Lewis’s theory does not get the verdict
that Pam’s button pressing is a cause. The only variation in Pam’s button
pressing is the time of the pressing or whether she presses at all. Bob can
and, in one development of the case, would stop this having an influence
on when Vic is electrocuted via his switchboard. He would quickly elec-
trocute Vic if she were to fail to press the button by a certain time (Schaf-
fer 2001: 15). Hence, Schaffer argues, Lewis must conclude Pam’s button
pressing is not a cause.
This is not correct. First, contrary to what Schaffer writes, it is plausible
that the ancestral of influence holds between Pam’s button pressing and
Vic’s electrocution. Pam’s button pressing influences Bob’s watching. If
Pam were to press the button, Bob would see the signal (and, hence, would
not act). If Pam were not to press the button, Bob would not see the signal
(and, hence, would act). This is enough to count as a substantial range of
not too distant alterations of Pam’s button pressing. If Schaffer is right that
Bob’s watching influences and, hence, causes Vic’s electrocution, by Lewis’s
lights, then Pam’s button pressing comes out as a cause after all. Schaffer
has just provided a truncated version of the third case Lewis considered as
a reason for taking the ancestral (Lewis 2000: 193). So long as we stick
with the idea of a back-up process which kicks in if the backed-up process
fails, a manoeuvre of this sort will always be possible.
Schaffer mentions a variant of the case which does not face this difficulty.
Bob presses his button regardless with the resulting signal trailing Pam’s by
a millisecond. In which case, appealing to the ancestral won’t resolve the
problem (Schaffer 2000: 16). Unfortunately, Lewis can wriggle out of that
too. As a glance at the formulation of his theory reveals (and contrary to
what Schaffer asserts), he does not require that the alteration of the effect
must be substantial (Schaffer 2000: 11). A minuscule time difference will
do. He appeals to this on occasions in his original discussion (Lewis 2000:
189). The problem is rather that, if Pam’s pressing the button is so rela-
tively uninfluential, Lewis’s theory would suggest that it is barely worth
mentioning as a cause. In this respect, his theory still seems to conflict with
our judgements.
But perhaps not if we pay greater attention to what can be considered an
alteration of Pam’s button pushing. Why isn’t Pam’s pushing a button set
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up to work earlier, or set up to produce a slightly larger delivery of electric
current to Vic, an alteration of Pam’s button pushing? Schaffer doesn’t say.
When Lewis discusses other cases, he is certainly willing to consider such
alterations. For example, he considers Suzy’s throwing a much heavier rock
an alteration of Suzy’s throwing a lighter rock (Lewis 2000: 191). So unless
this kind of alteration can be ruled out in some principled way, he is at
liberty to make this move regarding Schaffer’s variant case.2 If he is, then
the variant case is no problem. Pam’s button pressing is influential because
Bob does not adjust his behaviour to take into account Pam’s circumstances
and what she does. He just acts regardless. So it looks as if either appeal 
to the ancestral of influence or more significant alterations will deal with
Schaffer’s first charge whatever form of case we consider.
Schaffer’s second charge is that Lewis’s theory proclaims Bob’s watching
a cause of Vic’s electrocution in virtue of the fact that alterations of his
watching include Bob’s pressing buttons to electrocute Vic. Here it seems
that Schaffer faces something of a dilemma. Either he takes Bob’s watch-
ing to be the watching of a bystander, someone with no intention to inter-
vene, or he takes Bob’s watching to be that of a back-up man poised to act.
If he takes Bob as a back-up man, then it looks as if it is not that counter-
intuitive to claim that Bob is a cause of Vic’s electrocution. After all, he
could have stopped Pam’s button from working or jumped the gun. On the
other hand, if Schaffer takes Bob as a mere bystander, then it is not clear
why Bob’s various possible button pushings are alterations of Bob’s watch-
ing. We now no longer have Bob’s merely watching being one thing Bob
the back-up man may choose to do. To this line of objection about Bob as
bystander, Schaffer makes three responses. First, he argues that to rule out
playing with the switchboard as an alteration of Bob’s watching is ad hoc
(Schaffer 2001: 17). This charge seems unwarranted. Watching with one
eye, watching carefully, watching for a certain light, watching through
binoculars, and not watching at all, all these seem to be alterations of
watching as a bystander. Playing with the switchboard does not seem to be
an alteration of watching. It is not even a not-watching. It is not ad hoc to
rule out something counter-intuitive. Second, Schaffer argues that Lewis
needs to consider the alteration to Pam’s pressing in which she doesn’t press
but just stands around and watches so, by parity of reasoning, he must
allow that Bob’s button pressing is an alteration of his watching (Schaffer
2001: 17). If the point I made above about the kind of alterations to which
Lewis can appeal regarding Pam is correct, he does not have to assume that
Pam’s button pressing is completely excised, a point he emphasizes (Lewis
2000: 190). However, for the sake of argument, suppose that Lewis does
2 This would also, incidentally, deal with Schaffer’s magical trumping version of the
case. So I won’t discuss it further (Schaffer 2001: 16).
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need the complete excision of Pam’s pressing the button. Then all he needs
to consider is just that: that Pam does not press the button. It is tendentious
to describe this as Pam just standing around and watching. Schaffer himself
in another context argues that Bob’s watching is logically and causally dis-
tinct from his failing to press a button (Schaffer 2000: 13–14). In which
case, he is in no position now to claim that the first just amounts to the
second in the present circumstances. The final point Schaffer makes is that
we can make the alterations as ‘near-in’ as we like so that the merest move-
ment – for instance, watching with one eye – would have an effect on the
electrocution of Vic (Schaffer 2001: 17). If those were the circumstances,
though, it is far less clear that Bob’s watching is not a cause of the electro-
cution of Vic.
What adjustments to Schaffer’s case do we need to get a working
counter-example? We should focus on Bob the back-up man. Then there is
no need to argue that Bob’s watching is an alteration of his pressing the
button. It is a potential cause in itself. Variations in what he sees lead to
different actions. Suppose, in addition, that none of Bob’s buttons enable
him to stop or alter Pam’s signal when the button is depressed at t - 1. They
just work if she presses the button at another time or not at all. Then it
would seem that Bob’s watching cannot be a cause of Vic’s electrocution.
Omission or attempted intervention would make no difference to Vic’s
electrocution then. Yet alterations in Bob’s watching clearly influence Vic’s
electrocution. He could have brought about the electrocution earlier and
at different strengths. He could have stopped her signal at the time it
occurred if his watching had been in front of a working button. Bob’s
actual watching (just shortly after t - 1) would be counted as a cause when
it should not be.
How might Lewis deal with this type of case? The very feature of his
account which enables him to deal with some trumping cases (i.e. it does
not insist on ‘whether-whether dependence’) gives rise to the problem in
this case.3 In the past, Lewis has shown a willingness to allow his intuitive
causal judgements to govern his conception of what counts as close possi-
ble worlds (Lewis 1979). He may show just as great a willingness to allow
his intuitive causal judgements to mould his conception of alterations. In
which case, I think it is legitimate to wonder whether Lewis will be able to
3 There is a general question of whether Lewis’s approach is well-motivated by trump-
ing. It seems that the laws of magic in the case discussed are rather too convenient.
What happens if it is a law of magic that the first spell of the day, if it is at 12 noon
and to turn a specific prince into a frog, will be matched by the enchantment at 
midnight, and so on? Once Lewis allows magic into the equation, he needs a way 
of limiting its scope so that some influence will still be revealed. I know of no way of
doing this which is not ad hoc. In this I agree with Schaffer 2001: 16; Collins 2000:
231; and Jacob Rosen.
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devise a similarity metric of alterations which, on the one hand, allows that
Pam’s pressing a button with a different switchboard set-up is an alteration
of her button pressing and, on the other hand, does not allow that Bob’s
watching at a slightly different time when the button is working, or at the
same time with the button working after all, is an alteration of his watch-
ing at t - 1. Certainly it will not appeal to a pre-theoretically intuitive
notion of alteration. Minor differences in timing will be considered ‘too-
distant’. Of course, Lewis may respond that Bob’s watching really is a cause
after all – another spoil to the victor (Lewis 2000: 189). I do hope that’s
right. I might get lots of things done.4
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